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1 Introduction
In a broad sense, markets function well in allocating goods. Could they function well in
allocating votes? Consider a group taking a single binary decision via majority voting.
Majority voting ignores the intensity of voters’ preferences, allowing an intense minority to
lose to a tepid majority. In markets for goods, prices induce individuals to act according to
the relative strength of their preferences. If majority voting were preceded by a market for
votes, could intensity of preferences be expressed appropriately?
Markets for votes have long captured the imagination of philosophers, political scientists,
and economists.1 However, even ignoring ethical objections, finding a convincing answer to
the question just raised has proved difficult. The problem is a fundamental non-convexity
associated with vote trading: votes are intrinsically worthless, and their value depends on the
holdings of votes by all other individuals. Thus, demands are interdependent, and payoffs
discontinuous at the point at which a voter becomes pivotal. Both in a market for votes and
in log-rolling games, traditional equilibrium concepts such as competitive equilibrium or the
core typically fail to exist.2
Recently, a possible solution to the failure of equilibrium existence has been suggested.
Focusing on a competitive market where voters can trade votes for a numeraire, Casella,
Llorente-Saguer and Palfrey (2012) (CLP from now onward) propose the concept of ex ante
competitive equilibrium: traders are allowed to express probabilistic demands and the market
clears in expectation. At the equilibrium price, deviations from market clearing can occur,
but they must be unsystematic and unexpected. Ex post, the imbalance between demand
and supply is resolved by a rationing rule. CLP show that such an equilibrium exists in a
symmetric model where each voter has equal probability of favoring either alternative, and
where without vote trading the expected outcome of the vote is a tie.3
1Among economists and political scientists, the 1960’s and 1970’s in particular saw a large literature on
the topic, whether studying trades of votes for votes or buying and selling of votes on a market in exchange
for a numeraire. See: Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Coleman (1966, 1967), Park (1967), Wilson (1969),
Tullock (1970), Haefele (1971), Kadane (1972), Riker and Brams (1973), Mueller (1967, 1973), Bernholtz
(1973, 1974), Ferejohn (1974), Koehler (1975), Schwartz (1977). Among later contributions, see: Piketty
(1994), Philipson and Snyder (1996), Kultti and Salonen (2005). For ethical and philosophical discussions of
markets for votes, see, for example, Tobin (1970), Marshall (1977), Walzer (1983), Anderson (1993), Sandel
(2012), and Satz (2012).
2Ferejohn (1974), (Schwartz (1977, 1981), Shubik and van der Heyden (1978), Weiss (1988), Philipson
and Snyder (1996).
3Kultti and Salonen (2005) also propose a Walrasian approach to vote markets based on probabilistic
demands, but do not impose any market clearing condition. Recently Iaryczower and Oliveros (2013) have
The result addresses the existence problem that has hampered the study of vote markets,
and the concept of ex ante equilibrium is found to have good predictive power in a laboratory
experiment. The symmetry assumption, however, is restrictive and not ideally suited to the
question that motivated the research. What we want to know is whether minority voters
can buy enough votes from the majority to overcome their numerical inferiority, when both
groups are aware of their minority and majority status. The interest is not only theoretical.
In most applications, the two opposing groups are well informed about which side is holding
the majority: sides are not equal-sized and are well-established by party labels, cultural and
geopolitical characteristics, or historical voting patterns. This is the environment we study
in this paper.
The difficulty is that the more precise information exacerbates the non-convexity problem
associated with votes. The literature has conjectured, plausibly, that any equilibrium in a
market for votes requires uncertainty about the alternative preferred by a majority of the
voters.4 This paper studies and eventually contradicts this conjecture. In so doing, it
establishes two general points. First, the obstacles to equilibrium existence in a competitive
market for votes are logically unrelated to uncertainty about the direction of preferences.
Indeed, our results hold identically under different informational assumptions, and under
both complete and incomplete information, as long as voters know their own majority or
minority status.5 Second, the concept of ex ante competitive equilibrium generalizes to an
asymmetric setting: the contribution in CLP is not limited to a knife-edge case. We construct
an ex ante equilibrium that extends in intuitive fashion the equilibrium characterized by CLP.
We study a group of voters who take a single binary decision by majority voting. Be-
fore voting, individuals can buy and sell votes among themselves in a competitive market,
in exchange for a numeraire. No individual is liquidity constrained. We obtain two main
results. First, we identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing that an ex ante equilibrium
with vote trading exists for arbitrary electorate size and majority/minority partition. The
condition rules out the possibility that multiple members of one group all have preferences
proposed modeling vote-trading through decentralized bargaining.
4See for example Piketty (1994).
5Our results hold under complete information, when each voter’s direction and intensity of preferences
are publicly known. But they also hold if intensities of preferences are private information, and in this case
they hold under different scenarios: when each voter’s individual membership in the majority or minority
is publicly known; when the sizes of the two groups are known, but other voters’ individual membership is
not, and they hold when voters know their own minority or majority status, but cannot estimate precisely
the size of the two groups.
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that are much more intense (in a precise sense) than any member of the opposite group.
At small electorate sizes, we find that the equilibrium exists with high probability for stan-
dard intensity distributions–for example, if the minority is a third of the electorate and the
distribution of intensities is uniform, the equilibrium exists with probability larger than 98
percent with nine voters, and larger than 99.9 percent with 21 voters. In large electorates, an
ex ante equilibrium with trade exists with probability arbitrarily close to 1, for any intensity
distribution and any minority share.
Second, the equilibrium we characterize has strong properties that translate into a sys-
tematic bias in favor of the minority, relative to the efficient outcome: for any electorate
size, any majority/minority partition, and any distribution of intensities, the minority wins
more frequently than efficiency dictates.
In equilibrium, only the highest intensity member of each group demands votes with
positive probability; all other individuals offer their vote for sale. Of the two voters who
are potential buyers, the voter belonging to the minority is weakly more aggressive: he may
demand to buy with higher probability than the majority voter even when his intensity
is lower. Together, these properties imply that the market works not only to weaken but
to erase the advantage enjoyed by the majority.6 Because all other voters offer to sell
their votes, the two highest-intensity individuals must each demand enough votes to single-
handedly control a majority. Their distinct status as minority or majority members becomes
irrelevant. Again, this is particularly clear in large electorates. In such settings, the minority
is always expected to win half of the time, for any distribution of intensities and regardless
of its share of the electorate. As we summarize in the title of this paper: democracy–the
power of majority rule–is undone by the market: the numerical superiority of the majority
loses all its significance.
The market for votes always falls short of the first best. How it compares to majority
voting with no trade depends on the shape of the distribution of intensities. In a small
electorate, minority victories must reduce welfare if the wedge between the highest expected
intensity and the average intensity is not too large. The result is intuitive: even when the
highest value belongs to a minority voter, there is a trade-off between such a value and
the values forgone by majority members who are, by definition, more numerous. In a large
6The result echoes the conclusion of costly voting models, where the ”underdog effect” predicts higher
turn-out rates by the minority (Simon (1954), Gartner (1976), Levine and Palfrey (2007)). Especially in
large groups, the finding that participation can be small when it is costly is common to different models, for
example Osborne et al.(2000).
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electorate, the bias in favor of the minority is strong enough that ex ante welfare is always
lower than in the absence of trade, for any distribution of intensities. Because the minority
always wins with probability one half, the welfare loss is larger the smaller the minority size:
the expected loss can be quantified precisely and is inversely related to the minority size.
The equilibrium we construct echoes the equilibrium in CLP: a vote market leads in-
dividuals to either demand a majority of votes or sell. The robustness of this finding to
the existence of asymmetric, known groups with opposite preferences suggests that, by re-
establishing existence, the concept of ex ante equilibrium allows us to tap into a deeper vein
of economic intuition. Votes per se are worthless, and the market comes to resemble an
auction for decision power. As in an all-pay auction, the competition is between the two
individuals who have most to gain from controlling it, while the others refrain from partic-
ipating (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al. 1996, Siegel, 2009). The aggregate values of
the two opposing groups are not internalized and the final outcome is inefficient, but the
market functions as we should have expected.
In addition to supporting this interpretation of a market for votes, the asymmetric model
studied here delivers a number of novel predictions. First, because in both groups most
individuals are offering their vote for sale, demand for additional votes is just as likely to
arise from the majority as from the minority. Second, in equilibrium, intra-group trade and
super-majorities always arise with high probability, even though votes command a positive
price, the majority size is known, and all demands for votes are expressed simultaneously.
The intuition is clear: high intensity individuals need to preempt sales to the opposite group
by their own weak allies. We believe that the predictions are empirically very plausible, but
absent from the models of intra-group vote-buying we are familiar with.7
Beyond its strict tie to the existing studies of vote markets, this paper is related to two
other strands of literature. First, there is the important but different literature where can-
didates or lobbies buy voters’ or legislators’ votes: for example, Myerson (1993), Groseclose
and Snyder (1996), Dal Bo` (2007), Dekel, Jackson and Wolinsky (2008) and (2009). These
papers differ from the problem we study because in our case vote trading happens within
the committee (or the electorate). The individuals buying votes are members of the group
themselves, and each individual is potentially both a buyer and a seller. This matters be-
7Groseclose and Snyder’s (1996) conclusion that vote-buying leads to supermajorities has the same flavor
but a different origin. Their paper studies vote-buying in a legislature by two competing outside buyers, as
opposed to vote trading among voters, and their result is due to the buyers taking turns in proposing a deal
to the legislators, as opposed to the one-shot market studied here.
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cause it adds a public good aspect to vote trades: purchases of votes help all members of
one’s group and hurt all members of the opposite group.
Second, vote markets are not the only remedy advocated for majority rule’s failure to
recognize intensity of preferences in binary decisions. The mechanism design literature has
proposed mechanisms with side payments, building on Groves-Clarke taxes (e.g., d’Apremont
and Gerard-Varet 1979). However, these mechanisms have problems with bankruptcy, bud-
get balance, and collusion (Green and Laffont 1979, Mailath and Postlewaite 1990). A recent
literature suggests combining insights from mechanism design into the design of voting rules.
Goeree and Zhang (2012) and Weyl (2012) propose allowing voters to purchase votes from a
central agency at a price equal to the square of the number of votes purchased, a scheme with
strongly desirable asymptotic properties. Casella (2005, 2012), Jackson and Sonnenschein
(2007), and Hortala-Vallve (2012) propose mechanisms without transfer that allow agents to
express the relative intensity of their preferences by linking decisions across issues. Casella,
Gelman and Palfrey (2006), Casella, Palfrey and Riezman (2008), Engelmann and Grimm
(2012), and Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer (2010) test the performance of these mech-
anisms experimentally and find that efficiency levels are very close to theoretical equilibrium
predictions, even in the presence of some deviations from theoretical equilibrium strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model; section 3
characterizes the ex ante equilibrium whose properties we discuss in the rest of the paper;
section 4 studies the expected frequency of minority victories and expected welfare, and
compares these measures to the equivalent measures in the absence of a vote market and
in the utilitarian first best. Section 5 discusses the robustness of the results to alternative
assumptions about information, the rationing rule and the stochastic process generating
intensities. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix collects the proofs.
2 The Model
A committee of size n (odd) must decide between two alternatives, A and B. The committee
is divided into two groups with opposite preferences: M individuals prefer alternative A, and
m prefer alternative B, with m = n−M < M . We will use M and m to indicate both the
sizes of the two groups and the groups’ names. Each individual knows whether he belongs to
M or to m. Individuals differ not only in the direction of their preferences, but also in their
intensity. The model can incorporate different informational assumptions. For concreteness,
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we conduct our analysis in terms of two opposing parties, whose sizes and compositions are
publicly known, while individual intensities of preferences are private information. In a later
section, we discuss alternative assumptions.
The remainder of the model is borrowed from CLP. We summarize it briefly. Intensity
is indicated by a value vi representing the utility that individual i attaches to obtaining his
preferred alternative, relative to the competing one: thus the utility experienced by i as a
result of the committee’s decision is vi if i’s preferred alternative is chosen, and 0 if it is not.
We will use intensity and value interchangeably. Individual values are independent draws
from a common and commonly known distribution F (v) with support [0, 1]. We call v the
vector of realized values.
Each individual is endowed with one indivisible vote. The group decision is taken through
majority voting. Prior to voting, however, individuals can purchase or sell votes among
themselves in exchange for a numeraire. The trade of a vote is an actual transfer of the vote
and of all rights to its use. We normalize each voter’s endowment of the numeraire to zero
and allow borrowing at no cost. The important point is that no voter is budget constrained
and all are treated equally.8 Individual utility ui is given by:
ui = viI + ti (1)
where I equals 1 if i’s preferred decision is chosen and 0 otherwise, and ti is i’s net monetary
transfer, positive if i is a net seller of votes, or negative if he is a net buyer.
With two alternatives and a single voting decision, voting sincerely is always a weakly
dominant strategy, and we restrict our attention to sincere voting equilibria: after trading,
each individual casts all votes in his possession, if any, in support of the alternative he prefers.
Our focus is on the vote trading mechanism, and specifically on a competitive spot market
for votes.
We allow for probabilistic (mixed) demands. Let S = {s ∈ Z ≥ −1} be the set of pos-
sible pure demands for each agent, where Z is the set of integers, and a negative demand
corresponds to supply: agent i can offer to sell his vote, do nothing, or demand any positive
integer number of votes. The set of strategies for each voter is the set of probability measures
on S, ∆S, denoted by Σ. Elements of Σ are of the form σ : S → [0, 1] where, for each voter,
8Normalizing the endowment of the numeraire to zero and allowing borrowing simplifies the notation. As
will become apparent, the analysis would be identical if each voter were granted an endowment of one unit
of numeraire, with no borrowing.
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∑
s∈S σ (s) = 1 and σ (s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S.
If individuals adopt mixed strategies, the aggregate amounts of votes demanded and
of votes offered need not coincide ex post. A rationing rule R maps the profile of voters’
demands to a feasible allocation of votes. Indicating vectors by bold symbols, we denote
the set of feasible vote allocations by X = {x ∈ Nn|∑xi = n}. The rule R is a function
from realized demand profiles to the set of probability measures over vote allocations: R :
Sn → ∆X. For all s ∈ Sn, for any x in the support of R (s), we require xi ∈ [min(1, 1 +
si),max(1, 1 + si)] ∀i, and x = 1 + s with probability 1 if
∑
si = 0. In words, no voter with
positive demand can be required either to buy more votes than he demanded, or to sell his
vote; no voter who offered his vote for sale can be required to buy votes, and all demands
must be respected if they are all jointly feasible.
The particular mixed strategy profile, σ ∈ Σn, and the rationing rule, R, imply a proba-
bility distribution over the set of final vote allocations that we denote as rσ,R (·). For every
possible allocation x ∈ X, we denote by ϕi,x the probability that the committee decision co-
incides with voter i’s favorite alternative. Thus, given some strategy profile σ, the rationing
rule R, a vote price p, and equation (1), the ex ante expected utility of voter i is given by:
Ui (σ, R, p) =
∑
x∈X
rσ,R (x) [ϕi,xvi − (xi − 1) p] (2)
Each individual makes his trading and voting choices so as to maximize (2).
2.1 The Definition of Equilibrium
To allow for the existence of mixed strategies, we must depart from requiring that realized
demand always clear the market at the equilibrium price. The concept of ex ante competi-
tive equilibrium substitutes the traditional requirement of market balance with the weaker
condition that market demand and supply coincide in expectation. The discipline imposed
by market equilibrium is softened to the requirement that deviations from market balance
be unsystematic and unpredictable.
In equilibrium, individuals select strategies that maximize their expected utility, given
the strategies used by others and the price. Demands are interdependent and best-respond
to others’ demands. In a market for votes, such interdependence is inevitable because the
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value of a vote depends on the full profile of vote allocations.9
When the two opposing groups have different sizes, the notion of ex ante equilibrium
proposed in CLP needs to be extended. The reason is that best response strategies will
generally differ across members of the two groups. As a result, even though demands are
anonymous, the equilibrium, if it exists, conveys information about the direction of prefer-
ences associated to each demand, and individual strategies will take that information into
account. In the spirit of rational expectations models, we call an equilibrium fully revealing
if the price and individual strategies are identical to what they would be if all individual
information were pooled–here, with full information.
Surveying the literature on the existence of rational expectations equilibria, Allen and
Jordan (1998) identify the ”competitive message”–the price and the set of others’ demands–as
the smallest possible information message that generically supports a fully revealing rational
expectations equilibrium. The problem is that, in general, prices alone cannot reveal all
information when the dimensionality of the price set is lower than the dimensionality of the
state space. This is true in our environment, with a single price and a large-dimension state
space–the realized values and the group each value belongs to. Thus we need to condition
equilibrium behavior not only on the price but also on the set of others’ demands. We say
that the equilibrium is fully revealing if either: (1) the equilibrium price, together with the
set of others’ equilibrium demands and the rational belief that the market is in equilibrium,
fully convey to voter i the direction of preferences associated to each demand; or (2) the
information conveyed is partial but voter i has a unique best response, identical to his best
response under full information.
Define σ∗i (v) as individual i’s equilibrium strategy when all preferences are known, where
v stands for the vector of realized intensity values. Then:
Definition. The vector of strategies σ∗ and the price p∗ constitute a fully revealing ex ante
competitive equilibrium relative to rationing rule R if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. For each agent i, σ∗i satisfies
σ∗i ∈ argMax
σi∈Σ
Ui
(
σi,σ
∗
−i, R, p
∗)
9As a transparent example, all remaining votes have zero value if one voter holds a majority on his own.
In competitive equilibrium theory, such interdependence is found in analyses of contributions to public goods
(for example, Arrow and Hahn. 1971, pp.132-6).
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2. In expectation, the market clears, i.e.,
n∑
i=1
∑
s∈Sn
σ∗i (s) · s = 0
3. Given {σ∗−i, p∗} and the knowledge that the equilibrium is fully revealing,
σ∗i = σ
∗
i (v) for all i.
An important corollary is that if a fully revealing equilibrium exists, then it is also
an equilibrium of the complete information game. Thus everything that follows applies
identically to the alternative scenario in which all preferences and group memberships are
commonly known. 10
In general, the existence and the characterization of the equilibrium will depend on the
rationing rule. In line with the anonymous, centralized trading of the competitive equilib-
rium model, we require that the rationing rule be anonymous: traders’ orders are selected
randomly and treated equally, independently of the group the trader belongs to, the inten-
sity of his preferences, or the volume of his demand. Again following CLP, we concentrate
here, and for most of the analysis, on a rule called R1 or Rationing-by-Voter. R1 requires
that any positive demand for votes be either satisfied in full, or not at all: for any vector
of realized demands s, a final allocation x must satisfy xi ∈ {1, 1 + si} ∀i. Under R1, any
outstanding positive order for votes is equally likely to be selected; the order is satisfied if
there exists sufficient outstanding supply to do so fully, in which case the sellers are selected
with equal probability among all voters with outstanding offers to sell. If the order cannot
be fully satisfied, then it remains void. A second positive order is then randomly selected
from those remaining, with equal probability, and the process continues until either all or-
ders are satisfied or the only orders left outstanding are all infeasible. R1 is well-suited to
a market for votes because the value of a package of votes can change discontinuously with
changes of a single unit.11 In the final section of the paper, we return to the rationing rule
and discuss the conditions under which our results are robust to an alternative rule that
10Note that the reverse does not hold: an equilibrium of the full information game need not be a fully
revealing equilibrium of the incomplete information game, because it may be impossible for an agent to
extract all relevant information.
11R1 resembles All-or-Nothing (AON) orders used in securities trading: the order is executed at the
specified price only if it can be executed in full.
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allows for partially filled orders. Up to that point, all our results are to be read as relative
to rationing rule R1.
An equilibrium with no trade always exists–if no-one else is trading, an individual is
rationed with probability one–and is, trivially, fully revealing–strategies are identical to what
they would be with full information. Our interest is in equilibria with trade.
If an equilibrium existed in pure strategies, market balance would hold not only ex ante
but ex post, and no rationing would occur. We need to allow for mixed strategies and ex
ante equilibrium because in a market for votes with two opposing groups of known sizes, no
fully revealing competitive equilibrium with trade exists in pure strategies. This result is
well-known12 but we reproduce it here because it is the point of departure of our analysis.
Remark. For all n odd, m, F , and v, there is no price p∗and vector of strategies s∗(v, p∗)
such that s∗i (v, p
∗) = argMax
si∈S
Ui
(
si, s
∗
−i, p
∗) for all i and ∑i s∗i (v, p∗) = 0, unless s∗i (v, p∗) =
0 for all i.
Proof. The logic is simple. If there is trade, for all p > 0,
∑
i∈m s
∗
i (v, p) ∈ {−m, (M −m +
1)/2}: if the aggregate demand of minority voters is positive, it must equal the minimum
number of votes required to win; alternatively, at any positive price all losing votes must be
offered for sale. But
∑
i∈M s
∗
i (v, p) ≤ 0: in equilibrium, the aggregate demand by majority
voters cannot be positive. In addition,
∑
i∈M s
∗
i (v, p) 6= −(M −m+ 1)/2: if (M −m+ 1)/2
votes were traded, the remaining (M+m−1)/2 votes collectively held by M voters would be
worthless and thus offered for sale too. Thus for all p > 0,
∑
i∈m s
∗
i (v, p) +
∑
i∈M s
∗
i (v, p) 6=
0. If p = 0,
∑
i∈m s
∗
i (v, p) ≥ (M − m + 1)/2,13 but
∑
i∈M s
∗
i (v, p) ≥ −(M − m − 1)/2,
because the only supply can come from M voters whose vote is not pivotal. Thus for p = 0,∑
i∈m s
∗
i (v, p) +
∑
i∈M s
∗
i (v, p) > 0.
The question this paper addresses then is whether a fully revealing ex ante competitive
equilibrium with trade exists, given the knowledge of m and M .
12Ferejohn (1974), Philipson and Snyder (1996), Piketty (1994), Kultti and Salonen (2005), Casella, Pal-
frey, Turban (2014)
13We are assuming that at p = 0, voters on the losing side demand rather than sell votes. This is equivalent
to the standard assumption that goods are in excess demand at 0 price.
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3 Equilibrium Existence and Characterization
In this section we derive two theorems. Theorem 1 identifies a sufficient condition guaran-
teeing that an ex ante equilibrium with trade exists and provides a chracterization of such
an equilibrium. Theorem 2 shows that with large electorates the sufficient condition must
be satisfied with probability arbitrarily close to 1.
Given realized values v, we denote by v(1) the highest realized value; by G ∈ {m,M} the
group such that v(1) ∈ G–the group to which the highest intensity individual belongs–, and by
g the opposite group. We call vG (vg) the highest realized value in G (g) (thus by definition
vG = v(1)).
14 Finally, we denote by v(2)G the second highest value in G: v(2)G = max(vi ∈ {G
\ vG}).
Theorem 1. For all n odd, m, and F there exists a threshold µ(n) ∈ (0, 1) such that if
vg ≥ µ(n)v(2)G, there exists a fully revealing ex ante equilibrium with trade where vG and vg
randomize between demanding n−1
2
votes (with probabilities qG > 0 and qg > 0 respectively)
and selling their vote, and all other individuals sell.
The theorem is proved in the Appendix. The expression for µ(n) is not particularly
informative but it is worth noting that µ(n) is increasing in n for all n > 3 and converges to
1/2 for large n.15 The condition vg ≥ µ(n)v(2)G is necessary and sufficient for the existence
of the equilibrium characterized in the theorem, and is thus sufficient for the existence of a
fully revealing ex ante equilibrium with trade.16 For clarity, recall that individual preferences
are private information: v¯G and v¯g’s group memberships as well as a voter’s own position in
the values’ ranking–whether as v¯G or v¯g, or not–are revealed in equilibrium.
The theorem says that if the condition is satisfied, an equilibrium exists that always
assumes this form, regardless of the realized rankings in the values of the two groups. The
equilibrium exists whether G = m or G = M , and, because µ(n) < 1 for all n, the equilibrium
exists whether the two highest value voters are on opposite sides or on the same side, as
long as vg ≥ µ(n)v(2)G. The price p and the mixing probabilities, qG and qg, depend on vG,
14Throughout the paper, we use vi to denote the value of i but also occasionally, with abuse of notation,
the name of voter i. We use the notation v(1) to indicate the highest draw, as opposed to the more standard
v(n), for consistency with v(2)G.
15If n = 3, µ = 2/3.
16Theorem 1 does not state that no fully revealing equilibrium with trade exists if vg < µ(n)v(2)G. In a
specific example (M = 3, m = 2), we have constructed such an equilibrium for value realizations that violate
the condition (Casella, Palfrey and Turban, 2014).
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vg, and on whether G = m, or G = M , but the structure of the equilibrium is unchanged:
the highest-value individual belonging to M and the highest-value individual belonging to
m compete for dictatorship, while all others sell their votes.
When it exists, the equilibrium recalls the equilibrium in CLP. In that paper’s symmetric
environment, the competition for dictatorship is between the two highest-value individuals
overall; here it is between the two individuals with highest value and opposite preferences.
The robustness of the result to the different assumptions in the two models highlights a
central aspect of markets for votes. Note the similarity to the equilibrium of an all-pay
auction: all potential bidders but the two with highest values abstain from the contest; the
two with highest values submit strictly positive bids with positive probability, and the bids
are anchored by the property that the expected payoff of the second highest value bidder
is zero.17 By softening the requirement of exact market clearing, the concept of ex ante
equilibrium brings to light the essential nature of a market for votes: votes have no value
in themselves, and a well-functioning market for votes approximates an auction for decision
power. The market allocates such power to one of the two individuals with the highest
incentive to compete for it.
In the scenario studied here, with two opposing groups of different sizes, the equilibrium
has a number of additional features. First, there is a positive probability that the only
realized purchases are made by vM , that is, by the majority. The result is less paradoxical
than it seems: all other majority members are offering their votes for sale, and vM buys
to prevent the transfer of votes to the minority. Preemptive purchases by the majority are
very plausible: any sponsor of a bill needs to worry about the support of his weakest allies.
But to our knowledge they have no role in usual formalizations of vote trading. For the
same reason, the equilibrium predicts intra-group trading with high probability for all m
and M . Again, most voters are offering their vote for sale, and high value individuals need
to preempt sales to the opposite group by their own weak allies.
Second, unless all of one’s group votes are purchased, the winning majority will be larger
than the minimal winning coalition. Thus in general the equilibrium predicts super-majority,
a counter-intuitive result in a market for votes where votes command a positive price, the
number of additional votes the minority needs to win is common knowledge, and all demands
17Baye et al., 1996; Hillman and Riley, 1989; Siegel, 2009. With two known opposite sides, M and m, the
auction model would exhibit Identity-Dependent Externalities (Klose and Kovenock, 2013), with the result
that the equilibrium exists only under some condition–as indeed we also find here.
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are simultaneous.18
Characterizing the equilibrium mixing probabilities and the price provides a sharper
picture of the equilibrium we have constructed. The condition for its existence is invariant
to the group identity of the highest value individual (whether G = M , or G = m), and the
notation in Theorem 1 makes that clear. However qG, qg and p are not invariant and can
be expressed more transparently if we account for group membership explicitly. Call qm the
probability with which vm demands (n− 1)/2 votes, and 1− qm the probability with which
vm offers his vote for sale, and similarly for qM . Proposition 1 follows from the proof of
Theorem 1 in the Appendix:
Proposition 1. For all v such that the equilibrium in Theorem 1 exists, there exist two
thresholds, ρ(n) and ρ(n), with 1/2 ≤ ρ(n) < ρ(n) < 1 for all n, such that:
1. If vm ≥ ρ(n)vM , then qm = 1, qM = n−1n+1 , and p = 2n+1vM .
2. If vm ∈
(
ρ(n)vM , ρ(n)vM
)
, then qm ∈
(
n−1
n+1
, 1
)
, qM ∈
(
n−1
n+1
, 1
)
, and p ∈ ( 2
n+1
vm,
2
n+1
vM
)
.
3. If vm ≤ ρ(n)vM , then qm = n−1n+1 , qM = 1, and p = 2n+1vm.
If the equilibrium exists, given the size of the electorate n, qm, qM , and p depend ex-
clusively on vm and vM . If the disparity in the two values is large enough, then the voter
with higher value always demands (n − 1)/2 additional votes, while the other randomizes
between such a demand and offering his vote for sale; if the two values are instead close,
then both voters randomize.19 Strikingly, neither the equilibrium strategies nor the price
depend on the relative size of the two groups. The value of m affects the probabilities of
the inter-party ranking in the realizations of values v, but, given n and v, if the equilibrium
exists, qm, qM , and p are identical whether m = 1 or m = M − 1. The intuition is clear:
since all individuals but vm and vM always offer their vote for sale, the precise numerical
advantage of the majority is irrelevant in equilibrium. Either vm too offers his vote for sale,
and the majority wins, for any m ; or vm demands (n− 1)/2 votes, and any demand by vM
lower then (n− 1)/2 results in defeat with probability 1, for any m.
The details of the proposition tell us more. First, because ρ(n) < ρ(n) < 1, there exists
vm < vM such that qm > qM , but the reverse is never true. Thus not only do vM and vm
18As remarked in the Introduction, a similar result in Groseclose and Snyder (1996) applies to a different
model and has a different origin.
19The two thresholds ρ(n) and ρ(n) are defined precisely in the Appendix. Both converge to 1 at large n.
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demand the same number of votes, if they demand votes at all, but the minority’s strategy
is always weakly more aggressive. It is not difficult to see why: if no trade is concluded,
vM is sure to win, while vm is sure to lose; the less desirable outside option predisposes vm
towards buying. The same logic underlying the underdog effect in models of costly voting
operates in a market for votes20.
Second, although demanding a majority requires demanding more votes in larger elec-
torates, the price of a vote decreases at rate n. Using the expressions for ρ(n) and ρ(n) in
the Appendix, one can verify that a voter’s expenditure, p · (n−1
2
) if not rationed, is always
bounded above by min(vm, vM). Thus not only is the expenditure always finite, but, as must
be true in equilibrium, individuals always gain from having their demand satisfied.
We can then complement the proposition with the required condition for equilibrium
existence, in each of the three cases. Consider for example case (1) and suppose n > 3.
Because µ(n) < 1/2 < ρ(n) < ρ(n) < 1 for all n > 3, if vm ∈ [ρ(n)vM , vM ], then G = M ,
and vm > µ(n)v(2)M –hence if vm ∈ [ρ(n)vM , vM ], the equilibrium exists. If vm > vM ,
then G = m, and existence of equilibrium requires the additional condition vM > µ(n)v(2)m.
Hence Pr(vm ≥ ρ(n)vM , vM ≥ µv(2)m) is the probability that the equilibrium exists and
realized values falls under case (1). Using the same logic, no additional condition is required
in case (2); case (3) requires vm ≥ µv(2)M . Thus, for all n > 3, in the equilibrium we have
constructed:21
Pr (qm = 1) = Pr(vm ≥ ρvM , vM ≥ µv(2)m) ≡ Pr(v ∈ Am)
Pr
(
qm ∈
(
n− 1
n+ 1
, 1
)
, qM ∈
(
n− 1
n+ 1
, 1
))
= Pr(ρvM < vm < ρvM) ≡ Pr(v ∈ A)
Pr (qM = 1) = Pr(vm ≤ ρvM , vm ≥ µv(2)M) ≡ Pr(v ∈ AM),
where we use the notation Am, A, AM as short-hands for the corresponding regions of
the realizations of v. The subscript identifies the group of the voter who demands with
probability 1. By Proposition 1, no other value realizations can support the equilibrium of
Theorem 1, and no other strategies can be observed in such an equilibrium.
As n increases, the likelihood of realizations for which the equilibrium does not exist falls
drastically. For instance, if F is uniform and α = 1
3
, the equilibrium exists with probability
20Simon (1954), Gartner (1976); Levine and Palfrey (2007)
21Because µ(3) = 2/3 > 1/2, the case n = 3 is slightly different (see the Appendix). We treat it separately
in our proofs but to avoid clutter do not discuss it in the text.
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98.3% with n = 9, and more than 99.9% with n = 21. More generally, if the minority is a
non-vanishing fraction of the electorate,22 then with independent draws from any common
distribution F , at large n, both vg/vG and v(2)G/vG must approach the upper bound of the
distribution’s support. It then follows that when the electorate is large, the restriction on
realized values required for the existence of the equilibrium described in Theorem 1 is almost
certainly satisfied. Indeed this is our second result. Suppose m = bαnc for all n, where bαnc
is the largest integer not greater than αn, and α is a constant in (0, 1/2). Adding a subscript
n to indicate explicitly the dependence on the size of the market, we can state:
Theorem 2. Consider a sequence of vote markets. For any α ∈ (0, 1
2
)
and F , lim
n→∞
Pr n(vg,n ≥ µ(n)v(2)G,n) = 1.
Proof. The proof of the theorem is immediate. Given µ(n) < 1/2, the theorem follows if
limn→∞ Prn(vg,n > 1/2) = 1. But limn→∞ Prn(vg,n > 1/2) = limn→∞ 1 − [F (1/2)]bαnc = 1,
and the result is established.
Theorem 2 implies that for large n the equilibrium described in Theorem 1 exists with
probability that approaches 1. In addition, because in such an equilibrium the probabilities
with which vG and vg demand (n−1)/2 votes are bounded below by (n−1)/(n+1), at large
n both probabilities must also approach 1. Theorem 2 thus leads to the following Corollary:
Corollary 1. For any α ∈ (0, 1
2
)
and F , Pr[ lim
n→∞
qG,n(v) = 1] = 1, and Pr[ lim
n→∞
qG,n(v) =
1] = 1
4 Market Outcomes
4.1 Frequency of minority victories
The most unexpected feature of Theorem 1 is that when the equilibrium exists the market
outcome depends on the size of the minority only indirectly. As we remarked, if the equilib-
rium exists, given realized values the expected outcome is the same whether there is a single
minority voter or the minority comprises almost half of the electorate. Together with the
weakly more aggressive minority strategy highlighted by Proposition 1, this result suggests
22I.e. mn is bounded away from 0 as n −→∞.
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a systematic vote market bias in favor of the minority group: a higher frequency of minority
victories than efficiency dictates.
To evaluate this conjecture, we need to construct an equilibrium that exists for all value
draws, and define an efficiency benchmark. Since an equilibrium with no trade exists trivially
for all value realizations, we can construct an equilibrium such that if vg ≥ µ(n)v(2)G, then
trade occurs and the equilibrium of Theorem 1 is selected; if vg < µ(n)v(2)G, then no vote-
trading takes place and the majority wins with probability 1. Our equilibrium construction
thus minimizes the frequency of minority victories when the condition is not met.23 We call
θm the ex ante expected frequency of minority victories in such an equilibrium, before values
are drawn. Recall that x(v) is a random variable denoting a final allocation of votes for a
given value profile. Hence: θm ≡ PrF (
∑
i∈m xi(v) >
∑
j∈M xj(v)).
In line with the anonymity of the competitive market and of majority voting, we measure
efficiency by ex ante efficiency, treating each voter identically–expected utility before the
voter knows the group he belongs to and before values are drawn. Ex ante efficiency is
equivalent to the utilitarian criterion: it is maximized when, for each realization of values,
the group with higher aggregate value prevails. We call θ∗m the expected frequency of minority
victories under this efficiency benchmark: θ∗m ≡ PrF (
∑
i∈m vi >
∑
j∈M vi). To evaluate
whether a systematic pro-minority bias is indeed realized, in this section we compare θm to
θ∗m.
We begin by establishing a preliminary result. Because it can be of some general interest,
we report it here as a separate lemma.
Lemma 1. For all distributions F , if all vi, i ∈ m and i ∈ M are i.i.d. with distribution
F , then for all n and m, θ∗m ≤ 11+(Mm) ≤
m
n
.
The lemma is proved in the Appendix. It states that if values are i.i.d., then for any
distribution F the expected share of value configurations such that the aggregate minority
value is larger than the aggregate majority value, and thus a minority victory is efficient,
cannot be larger than the share of the minority in the electorate. The statement is intuitive
because it establishes an upper bound for θ∗m that holds for all F , n, and m and can be
compared to θm, the equilibrium fraction of expected minority victories.
Conditional on value realizations, θm(v) is either characterized precisely by the strategies
in Theorem 1, or equals 0, by our equilibrium construction, if the condition in Theorem 1
23As noted earlier, equilibria with trade may exist when vg < µ(n)v(2)G, and thus the expected fraction
of minority victories must be weakly higher than in our equilibrium construction.
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is not satisfied. In particular, because under Theorem 1 the final votes’ allocation depends
only on the probability with which vm and vM demand votes, we can write:
θm(v) =
qm(v)(1− qM(v)) + 12 · qm(v)qM(v) if vg ≥ µ(n)v(2)G0 if vg < µ(n)v(2)G
where the notation recognizes explicitly that the equilibrium buying probabilities qm and qM
depend on the realized values v. Using the values of – or bounds on – qm and qM described
in Proposition 1, we can thus find a lower bound for θm:
θm ≥
(
n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
)
Pr (v ∈ Am) +
(
n− 1
2(n+ 1)
)
[Pr (v ∈ AM) + Pr (v ∈ A)] ≡ θm (3)
with strong inequality if Pr (v ∈ A) > 0. The probability of realizations in the different
regions of the value space depends on F , and thus so does θm. Yet, as we prove in the
Appendix:
Proposition 2. For all n, m , and F , θm > θ
∗
m.
Relatively to utilitarian efficiency, the market, at least in the equilibrium we have char-
acterized, always leads to excessive minority victories. Remarkably, the conclusion holds
for all electorate sizes, regardless of the size of the minority and of the shape of the values
distribution. An example can help in making the proposition concrete. Suppose that F is
uniform. Figure 1 plots θm, on the vertical axis, against m/n ≡ α on the horizontal axis,
with m = 1, .., (n− 1)/2. The different panels correspond to different values of n: n = 9, 15,
and 21. In each panel, the 450 line thus equals m/n = α, and by Lemma 1, since θ∗m ≤ m/n,
if θm > m/n, it follows that θm > θ
∗
m. The figure shows that θm can be surprisingly large,
especially at low m/n. For example, if m = 1, θm is 33 percent at n = 9 (when m is 11
percent of the voters) and remains almost 29 percent at n = 21 (when m is just below 5
percent of the voters).
In a large electorate, the expected fraction of equilibrium minority victories can be made
precise. The result confirms the magnitude of the pro-minority bias at low m/n highlighted
by Figure 1. The points of departure are Theorem 2 and its Corollary in the previous section:
if n is large, with probability approaching 1, realized values satisfy the condition in Theorem
1, and again with probability approaching 1, voters vm and vM both demand (n−1)/2 votes,
while all other voters offer their votes for sale. An immediate and unexpected result then
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Figure 1: Lower bound on the probability of minority victories, as function of α = m
n
. Values
are i.i.d. drawn from a uniform distribution.
follows: the final outcome depends exclusively on which one of vm and vM has his order
filled, and since both have identical chances, both win with equal probability. Theorem 2
and its Corollary directly imply: 24
Proposition 3. Consider a sequence of vote markets, such that for all n, m = bαnc, with
α ∈ (0, 1
2
)
. Then for any α and F , lim
n→∞
θm,n =
1
2
. Moreover, Pr[ lim
n→∞
θm,n(v) =
1
2
] = 1.
At sufficiently large market size, the minority is expected to win with probability ar-
bitrarily close to 1/2, for any minority share and for any distribution from which values
are drawn. Note that the proposition is very strong; it states not only that the ex ante
expected frequency of minority victories (θm) converges to 1/2, but that the expected fre-
quency of minority victories converges to 1/2 for all value realizations, except on a set with
zero probability (θm(v) −→
a.s
1/2).
Given the previous results, the intuition is straightforward, but the result remains sur-
prising. Whether the minority is 40 percent of the total electorate, 25 percent, or 10 percent,
as long as it is not negligible, in a sufficiently large vote market there is an equilibrium such
that the minority wins with probability 1/2 for any shape of the value distribution. After
trade, the minority and the majority group are equally likely to control a majority of the
votes. The market nullifies majority voting: following the will of the electorate becomes
identical to flipping a coin.
24For v satisfying the condition in Theorem 1, θm,n(v) is a continuous function of qG¯,n(v) and qg¯,n(v).
By Theorem 2, its Corollary, and the continuous mapping theorem, θm,n(v) −→
a.s
1/2.
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Although Proposition 3 is a limit result, Figure 1 shows that convergence towards high
fractions of minority victories can be very fast. We noted that, with F uniform, at n = 9,
m = 1 corresponds to θm = 0.33. Holding m = bn/9c, θm grows quickly with n: it is already
higher than 0.40 at n = 19 (with only two voters belonging to the minority), and just below
0.45 at n = 27. The limit case is particularly stark but the logic it highlights underlies the
small sample results as well.
4.2 Welfare
Beyond the existence of a bias, we are finally interested in the welfare properties of the
market. Since θm > θ
∗
m, we know that the market falls short of efficiency. But how does the
market compare to majority voting in the absence of vote trading? To address this question
we need a direct comparison of ex ante utilities. We call W the ex ante expected utility in
the equilibrium we have constructed, and W0 the ex ante expected utility in the absence of
vote trading (i.e. with simple majority voting), and denote A = AM ∪ Am ∪ A:
nW =
∫
v∈A
[
(1− θm(v))
∑
i∈M
vi + θm(v)
∑
j∈m
vj
]
dF n(v) +
∫
v/∈A
[∑
i∈M
vi
]
dF n(v) (4)
nW0 =
∫
v
[∑
i∈M
vi
]
dF n(v) (5)
If n is small, the welfare comparison between the vote market and no-trade depends on the
shape of the value distribution. Define EF (v) and EF,n(v(1)) as, respectively, the expectation
of a random variable with distribution F , and the expectation of the maximum of an i.i.d.
sample of size n drawn from F .25 Then:
Proposition 4. For all F , n, and m, if EF (v) >
2(n−m)
n(n−2m+1)EF,n(v(1)) then W < W0.
Proposition 4 states that if F ’s expected value is not too small relative to the expected
highest order statistics, then expected welfare with the market must be lower than expected
welfare with simple majority voting and no trade. Note that the condition it establishes is
sufficient, not necessary. Predictably, the condition is more stringent–the market’s relative
performance improves–the larger is the minority. If we set m = n−1
2
, the condition simplifies
to EF (v) >
(
n+1
2n
)
EF,n(v(1)), a stricter requirement guaranteeing W < W0 for all m and n.
25We use the notation EF,n(v(1)), as opposed to EF (v(n)), for consistency with v(1).
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Why is the ratio Ev/Ev(1) important?
26 In the best of cases, i.e. when vm = v(1), a
minority victory means that the smaller side prevails, reflecting the realization among its
members of a particularly high value. The higher is the ratio Ev/Ev(1), the smaller is the
expected distance between the high outlier and the other realized values, and the more costly
is the neglect of the majority’s larger size. Suppose for example that F = vb, with b > 0.
Then Ev/Ev(1) = (bn+ 1)/(bn+n), a ratio increasing in b. The condition in the proposition
is satisfied for all b > 1/(n− 2m).27
The complications tied to the specific shape of F disappear when the market is large.
Setting m = bαnc, the condition in Proposition 4 becomes:
EF (v) >
2(1− α)
n(1− 2α) + 1EF,n(v(1)) =⇒ Wn < W0n.
For any α < 1/2, limn−>∞
2(1−α)
n(1−2α)+1 = 0: at very large n the condition is always satisfied, for
any F . As in the previous asymptotic results, the finding can be stated in stronger terms:
the welfare ranking holds not only in expected terms but as almost sure convergence; that
is, in the limit, for all realizations of values, except a zero probability set:28
Proposition 5. Consider a sequence of vote markets. For any α ∈ (0, 1
2
) and F ,
limn−→∞(Wn/W0n) = 12(1−α) < 1. Moreover: Pr[ limn−→∞
Wn(v)
W0n(v)
= 1
2(1−α) ] = 1.
For any non-trivial minority size and for any distribution of values, with a sufficiently
large electorate vote-trading lowers welfare. Note the contribution of the proposition. The
26We omit the subscript F , trusting that there will be no confusion.
27Given a specific F , tighter conditions can be found. We show in Casella and Turban (2012) that if
F = vb, then EW < EW0 if b ≥ 1, a tighter bound which includes the uniform distribution.
28For all v that satisfy the condition in Theorem 1:
nWn(v) =
(1− θm,n(v)) ∑
i∈M
vi + θm,n(v)
∑
j∈m
vj

In addition for any such v, by Theorem 1, θm,n(v) ∈
[
n−1
2(n+1) ,
n+3
2(n+1)
]
. Thus, for such values:
nWn(v) ∈
[
n− 1
2(n+ 1)
n∑
i=1
vi,
n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
n∑
i=1
vi
]
Theorem 2, the continuous mapping theorem, and the strong law of large numbers then give us immediately
Wn(v) −→
a.s
Ev/2. But by (5) and the strong law of large numbers, W0,n(v) −→
a.s
(1 − α)Ev. Using the
continuous mapping theorem a final time, we then obtain (Wn(v)/W0,n(v)) −→
a.s
1
2(1−α) .
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assumption of i.i.d. value draws implies that, in terms of ex ante expected utility, majority
voting without trade must be asymptotically efficient. But there is no a priori reason why
a market for votes should not be. If the price becomes negligible (as the probability that a
single vote be pivotal becomes negligible), a market for votes could in principle support an
equilibrium with negligible minority victories, and negligible efficiency losses. By Proposition
3, however, we know that this is not the case: the minority is always expected to win as
frequently as the majority wins. As a result, the efficiency loss is both precisely quantifiable
and significant. If the minority is a third of the electorate, for example, the loss in ex ante
utility is 25 percent; if it is 15 percent, the loss is more than 40 percent.
5 Robustness of the equilibrium
5.1 Alternative information assumptions
We described the model in Section 2 by stating that both the precise values of m and M and
the compositions of the two group are commonly known. As mentioned earlier, however, our
results extend to a range of different informational scenarios.
Knowing the exact composition of each group–which voter belongs to which group–plays
no role in the analysis because demands in the competitive market are anonymous. The
assumption that group membership is known seems preferable in the case of small committees
and inappropriate in the case of a large electorate. Both scenarios are consistent with the
equilibrium we have characterized.
Exact knowledge of the sizes of the two groups is not required either. Theorem 1 relies on
one central assumption: each voter knows that a majority and a minority exist and knows
which group he belongs to. Given this, the proof does not depend on precise information on
the values of m and M . In particular, equilibrium strategies do not require individuals to
form expectations of the two group sizes. Intuitively, the exact sizes are irrelevant because in
equilibrium, for any m and M , the only two demands with positive probability correspond to
(n− 1)/2 votes, while everyone else sells. The results on the expected frequency of minority
victories and on ex ante expected utility also hold unchanged if there is uncertainty about
group sizes: because they hold for any m and M , they hold when the sizes are uncertain29.
29In the case of large electorate, suppose m = bαnc, where α is a random variable distributed according
to some CDF H over [a, b] with a > 0, b < 12 . For the proof of Theorem 2, note that P (v¯g ≥ µ(n)v(2)G) ≥
P (v¯g ≥ 12 ) ≥ 1− [F (1/2)]banc. For a > 0, limn→∞1− [F (1/2)]banc = 1. The result follows. For Propositions
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The results are robust not only to introducing more uncertainty, but also to the opposite
change in assumptions: introducing more information. Because of the focus on a fully
revealing equilibrium, the analysis remains identical if we assume that demands are not
anonymous, so that not only m and M and the groups’ composition are publicly known,
but so is the identity of the voter expressing each demand. In fact, as noted previously, full
revelation in equilibrium means that the results remain identical when all voters’ preferences
are public information – not only the direction of preferences but also the realized value for
each voter. The assumption of complete information would allows us to substitute knowledge
of the full competitive message with rational beliefs about strategies. Influential voices in
the literature defend knowledge of both the equilibrium price and demands as the correct
understanding of competitive equilibrium (Hurwicz (1977) and Mount and Reiter (1974)).
It remains, however, a high informational requirement. In some situations, especially with
small committees and members who interact regularly, full information on preferences may
be a better modeling alternative.
5.2 An alternative rationing rule
The equilibrium strategies appear extreme: individuals either demand a majority of votes or
sell. As in CLP, we want to verify that this is not an artefact of the all-or-nothing rationing
rule (either an order is fully filled or it is passed over). CLP consider the following alternative
rule, which they call R2, or rationing-by-vote. If voters’ orders result in excess supply, the
votes to be sold are chosen randomly from each seller, with equal probability. If instead
there is excess demand, any vote supplied is randomly allocated to one of the individuals
with outstanding purchasing orders, with equal probability. An order remains outstanding
until it has been completely filled. When all supply is allocated, each individual who put in
an order must purchase all units that have been directed to him, even if the order is only
partially filled. Formally, we require xi ∈ {0, 1, 2, .., 1+si} for any x in the support of R2 (s).
Like R1, R2 is anonymous. Contrary to R1, it guarantees that only one side of the market
2 and 4, we have not verified whether almost sure convergence holds when α is uncertain, but the results
on expectations extend immediately. For Proposition 3, denote θm,n(α) the expected fraction of minority
victories, given α. Hence θm,n =
∫ b
a
θm,n(α)dH(α). For all α, θm,n (α) → 12 . In addition, for all n, α,
|θm,n(α)| < 1. Hence by the bounded convergence theorem, θm,n →
∫ b
a
1
2dH(α) =
1
2 . Identical reasoning
can be used for Proposition 5. For any given α, denote Wn(α) the equilibrium welfare. Thus Wn =∫ b
a
Wn(α)dH(α). For all α, Wn(α) → Ev2 , and for all n, α, |Wn(α)| < 1. By the bounded convergence
theorem, Wn →
∫ b
a
Ev
2 dH(α) =
Ev
2 . We can proceed likewise for W0.
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is ever rationed, but its requirement that partially filled orders be accepted seems ill-suited
to a market for votes, where the value of votes hinges on pivotality, and thus on the exact
number of votes transacted.
At n = 3, R2 and R1 are identical and Theorem 1 applies. Suppose then n > 3:
Theorem 3. Suppose R2 is the rationing rule. For all n odd, m, and F there exists a
threshold µ(n) ∈ (0, 1) such that if vg ≥ µR2(n)Max[v(2)G, v(2)g], there exists a fully revealing
ex ante equilibrium with trade where vG and vg randomize between demanding (n − 1)/2
votes (with probabilities q′
G
> 0 and q′g > 0 respectively) and selling their vote, and all other
individuals sell.
The theorem is proved in Appendix B. Its similarity to Theorem 1 is apparent. There
are two main differences: first, the thresholds in the two theorems differ, and µR2(n) >
µ(n), implying that the equilibrium exists under R2 under more restrictive conditions than
under R1. In particular, limn−→∞ µR2(n) = ∞: whereas under R1 the probability that the
equilibrium exists in a very large market converges to 1, the probability converges to 0 under
R2. Second, as can be verified in the Appendix, when the equilibrium exists, the equilibrium
price p′ is consistently lower than p, the equilibrium price under R1. The intuition is clear:
when both vG and vg submit demands for (n − 1)/2 votes, one of the two will receive and
be charged for (n − 3)/2 votes, useless votes, since the opponent will hold a majority. To
compensate for this risk, the equilibrium price must be lower.30
The choice of rationing rule poses a number of interesting but challenging questions. We
know that in general the equilibrium must depend on the exact rule, and we can debate
whether the rationing rule is better thought of as part of the institution, controlled by the
market designer, or as part of the equilibrium, and interpreted as reduced form for the
complex, decentralized system of search that underlies the trades.31 Our goal here is not
to address these broad questions but to make a narrower point: Theorem 3 shows that the
equilibrium discussed in this paper is not the artefact of one specific rationing rule, and in
particular of the all-or-nothing nature of R1.
30There is a third difference as well. As the proof in Appendix B makes clear, the condition vg ≥
µR2(n)Max[v(2)G, v(2)g] is sufficient for the existence of the equilibrium in Theorem 3–there are value real-
izations for which weaker conditions are necessary–whereas under R1 the condition in Theorem 1 is necessary
and sufficient for the equilibrium characterized there.
31See for example Green (1980) for a compelling exposition of the second interpretation.
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5.3 Correlated and not identically distributed values
We have assumed so far that values are independent both across groups and within groups,
and identically distributed according to some distribution F . The assumption allowed us
to provide simple closed form solutions, but the logic of the arguments shows that neither
independence nor a common distribution are necessary for our more substantive results.
Theorem 1 states a sufficient condition for a trading equilibrium that depends only on the
existence of a sufficient wedge between vg and v(2)G, the realized highest values in the two
groups. Nor does the equilibrium depend on F : given m, M , R, p, and others’ strategies, a
voter’s best response is fully identified. The probability that the condition in Theorem 1 is
satisfied does depend on F , but the asymptotic result in Theorem 2 is robust to significant
generalization.
Particularly relevant to our voting environment is the possibility of correlation in val-
ues. Consider then the following standard model, where the assumption of independence is
weakened to conditional independence:
vi = vm + εi for all i ∈ m
vj = vM + uj for all j ∈M
where vm (vM) is a common value shared by all m (M) voters, and εi and uj are idiosyncratic
components, independently drawn from distribution Gm(ε), with full support [0, ε], and
GM(u), with full support [0, u]. For all fixed α ∈ (0, 1/2), as n −→ ∞, vm −→ vm + ε, and
vM −→ vM+u. Thus for all 2(vM+u) ≥ (vm+ε) ≥ vM+u2 the equilibrium of Theorem 1 exists
with probability approaching 1 asymptotically.32 And if the equilibrium exists, Proposition
3 follows: asymptotically, the minority is expected to win with probability 1/2.
Relative to our previous results, there are then two qualifications. First, to ensure that the
equilibrium always exists asymptotically, we need additional conditions on the distributions
of values, here on vm, vM , ε, and u. Second, the welfare results need to be re-evaluated
and again in general will depend on the distributions. In this example, if vm + EGm(ε)
is sufficiently larger than vM + EGM (u), then, depending on α, the vote market could be
asymptotically superior to simple majority voting. If the distributions differ between the
two groups, predictably the conclusions will depend on how they differ. Note however that
neither qualification stems from relaxing independence. Our asymptotic results require that
32We are using limn−→∞ µ(n) = 1/2.
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the extremum statistic of the value draws in each group should converge to the upper bound
of the support. The condition is violated if all values are perfectly correlated, but can
accommodate high degrees of dependence33.
6 Conclusions
How does a vote market function when voters are aware of their minority and majority
status? In this paper, we have borrowed the concept of ex ante competitive equilibrium
from Casella, Llorente-Saguer and Palfrey (2012) (CLP) and extended their model to an
asymmetric setting where each voter knows that a majority and a minority exist, and knows
which of the two groups he belongs to. We have characterized a sufficient condition for
the existence of an ex ante equilibrium with trade for any electorate size, any majority
advantage, and any distribution of intensities. In equilibrium, only two voters, the highest
intensity voters on each side, demand votes with positive probabilities; all others offer their
votes for sale. The two voters assign positive probability to only two actions: either selling,
or demanding enough votes to alone control a majority of all votes.
The similarity to the equilibrium in CLP, where individuals are symmetric and equally
likely to favor either alternative, suggests to us that, by re-establishing existence, the concept
of ex ante equilibrium sheds light on a fundamental aspect of vote markets: votes per se are
worthless; what is traded is decision power. The market becomes an auction for power. In
line with well-known results from all-pay auctions, only the two individuals who most value
the ownership of such power compete for it.
The probability of either group’s victory depends only on the action of its most intense
member and gives no direct weight to the size of the group. For any number of voters,
any minority size, and any distribution of intensities, the market results in more frequent
minority victories than efficiency dictates. In a large electorate, strikingly, the minority
always wins with probability one half, regardless of its relative size. The systematic bias in
favor of the minority exacts welfare costs, and the market can be welfare inferior to simple
33For example, statisticians working on limit distributions for maxima have proposed the concept of m-
dependence. When values are drawn in a natural sequence (think of floods over time), m-dependence applies
when there exists a finite m such that draws that are more than m steps apart are independent (Hoeffding
and Robbins, 1948). In our application, the concept could be relevant for geographically or ideologically
concentrated subgroups of voters. Theorem 2 and Proposition 5 continue to hold in this case, under minor
regularity assumptions.
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majority voting with no vote trading.
The results we have obtained are surprisingly clear-cut for such a long-debated problem.
They depend on the concept of ex ante equilibrium and the implementation of such an
equilibrium in our model–more precisely on the rationing rule. We focus our research project
on competitive equilibrium, because we consider it the first tool of an economist and the
first line of analysis of a trading problem. Thus we have restricted all trades to take place
via a single price, in centralized, anonymous exchanges. In line with this approach, we
have studied two rationing rules, both anonymous. The two rules support equilibria that
are very closely related, in fact have identical structure, strengthening our beliefs that,
given competitive equilibrium, the results depend on the special nature of the good traded–
votes–more than on the details of the model. More support for this conclusion comes from
experimental results. Both CLP and Casella, Palfrey and Turban (2014) test the model
though the traditional platform used in market experiments: a continuous double auction
with publicly visible bids and asks. The platform does not impose any rationing rule or any
aggregate market clearing requirement, letting subjects propose and accept offers as they
see fit within a specified time limit. The experimental results are in line with the theoretical
predictions: the average transacted price converges towards the equilibrium price, purchases
of votes are heavily weighted towards the two highest-intensity voters, whether overall in the
symmetric case (CLP), or in each of the two groups, in the presence of asymmetry (Casella,
Palfrey and Turban). When the two groups have different sizes, the inefficiently high fraction
of minority victories is confirmed experimentally in every single session, and so is the welfare
loss, relative to no trade. At least for these experiments, the conceptual model we have built,
based on the notion of ex-ante competitive equilibrium and an anonymous rationing rule,
appears to have predictive power.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. For all n odd, m, and F there exists a threshold µ(n) ∈ (0, 1) such that if
vg ≥ µ(n)v(2)G, there exists a fully revealing ex ante equilibrium with trade where vG and vg
randomize between demanding n−1
2
votes (with probabilities qG > 0 and qg > 0 respectively)
and selling their vote, and all other individuals sell.
Proof. The threshold µ(n) is given by:
µ(n) =

2
3
if n = 3
max
{
(n−2)(n−1)
2(n2+n−5) ,
(n−2)(n−1)(n+1)
2(n3+3n2−19n+21)
}
if n > 3
(6)
The theorem is implied by the following two lemmas. Lemma 2 characterizes the case
G = M and Lemma 3 the case G = m.
Lemma 2. Suppose G = M (or vG = vM vg = vm,). Then if vm ∈
[
µ(n)v(2)M , vM
]
, the
strategies described in the theorem are a fully revealing ex ante competitive equilibrium for
all n odd, m, and F . The mixing probabilities qM and qm and the price p depend on the
realizations of vm and vM . There exist two thresholds
1
2
≤ ρ(n) < ρ(n) < 1 such that:
(a) Case n > 3
1. If vm ∈
[
µ(n)v(2)M , ρ(n)vM
]
, qM , qm, and p satisfy:
qM = 1
qm =
n− 1
n+ 1
(7)
p = 2
vm
n+ 1
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2. If vm ∈ [ρ(n)vM , ρ(n)vM ], qM , qm, and p satisfy:
qm + qM =
2n
n+ 1
p =
2qmvM
2(n− 1)− (n− 3)qm (8)
p =
2(2− qM)vm
2(n− 1)− (n− 3)qM
.
3. If vm ∈ [ρ(n)vM , vM ], qM , qm, and p satisfy:
qm = 1
qM =
n− 1
(n+ 1)
(9)
p = 2
vM
n+ 1
The two thresholds ρ(n) and ρ(n) are given by:
ρ(n) =
n+ 1
n+ 5
(10)
ρ(n) =
(n− 1)(n+ 5)
(n+ 3)(n+ 1)
(b) Case n = 3
1. If v(2)M ≤ 34vM , then µ(3)v(2)M ≤ ρ(3)vM , and the characterization in part (a)
above applies unchanged. If v(2)M >
3
4
vM , then:
2. If vm ∈ [µ(3)v(2)M , ρ(3)vM ], qM , qm, and p satisfy system 8; if vm ∈ [ρ(3)vM , vM ],
qM , qm, andp satisfy system 9.
Lemma 3. Suppose G = m (or vG = vm and vg = vM). Then if vM ∈
[
µ(n)v(2)m, vm
]
,
where µ(n) is given by relation 6 above, the strategies described in the theorem, together with
the price and mixing probabilities given by system 9 are a fully revealing ex ante competitive
equilibrium for all n odd, m, and F .
The proof is organized in two stages. First, we show that if the direction of preferences
associated with each demand is commonly known, the strategies and price described above
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are an equilibrium. Second, we show that when preferences are private information the
equilibrium is fully revealing.
Ex ante equilibrium with full information
Suppose first that preferences are publicly known. We show here that the three systems
7, 8, and 9 characterize an ex ante equilibrium for each corresponding range of realized
valuations.
1. Consider a candidate equilibrium with qM ∈ (0, 1), qm ∈ (0, 1). Expected market
balance requires (qM + qm)(n− 1)/2 = (n− 2) + (1− qM) + (1− qm), or:
qM + qm =
2n
n+ 1
(11)
Denote by UM(s) the expected utility to voter vM from demand s. Then:
UM
(
n− 1
2
)
= qm
(
vM
2
− n− 1
4
p
)
+ (1− qm)
(
vM − n− 1
2
p
)
UM (−1) = qm
(p
2
)
+ (1− qm) (vM)
where we are assuming that voter vM is informed that the other voter randomizing
with probability qm belongs to the minority. Voter vM is indifferent between the two
pure demands if and only if:
p =
2qmvM
n+ 1 + (n− 3)(1− qm) (12)
Similarly, the indifference condition for voter vm requires
p =
2(2− qM)vm
n+ 1 + (n− 3)qM
(13)
Equations 11, 12 and 13 corresponds to system 7 in Lemma 2. The existence of a
solution is not guaranteed. There is a solution if and only if there exists qM ∈ [0, 1]
and qm ∈ [0, 1] with qM + qm = 2nn+1 such that (12)=)13). Such conditions are satisfied
if and only if vm ∈ [ρ(n)vM , ρ¯(n)vM ] where ρ(n) = n+1n+5 and ρ¯(n) = (n−1)(n+5)(n+3)(n+1) .
Note that 1
2
≤ ρ(n) < ρ¯(n) < 1 for all n ≥ 3. To verify that this is indeed an
equilibrium, we need to rule out profitable deviations.First, for any voter, any demand
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si > n− 1 is always fully rationed, and thus is equivalent to si = 0.
(i) Consider first voter vM . For any sM ∈ (n−12 , n − 1], UM(sM) < UM(n−12 ): de-
manding more votes than required to achieve a strict majority does not af-
fect the probability of rationing and is strictly costly. For any sM ∈ [0, n−12 ),
UM(sM) < UM(−1): demanding less than n−12 votes is dominated by selling. To
see this, note that when sm =
n−1
2
, any sM <
n−1
2
guarantees that vm will not
be rationed and will win (because all other voters are selling). Thus, whether sM
∈ (0, n−1
2
) and the action is strictly costly, or sM = 0 and voter vM stays out of
the market, when sm =
n−1
2
, any sM ∈ [0, n−12 ) is strictly dominated by selling.
When sm = −1, any sM ∈ (0, n−12 ] is dominated by sM ∈ {−1, 0} and these two
actions are equivalent because both sM = −1 and sM = 0 induce no trade and
guarantee a majority victory. Therefore, when facing the strategy profile defined
in the candidate equilibrium, vM ’s best response can only be either sM = −1 or
sM =
n−1
2
. System 7 guarantees that vM is indifferent between the two demands.
(ii) Consider now voter vm. As above, for any sm ∈
(
n−1
2
, n− 1], Um(sm) < Um(n−12 ).
It is also clear that Um(0) < Um(−1): the two demands are equivalent if sM = −1
and selling is strictly superior to staying out of the market if sM =
n−1
2
. The
question is whether vm could gain by demanding less than
n−1
2
votes. Consider
the relevant expected utilities:
Um
(
n− 1
2
)
= (1− qM¯)
(
v¯m − n− 1
2
p
)
+ qM¯
(
v¯m
2
− n− 1
4
p
)
Um (−1) = (1− qM¯) · 0 + qM¯
(p
2
)
(14)
Um (x) = (1− qM¯) (P (x)v¯m − xp) + qM¯ (−xp)
where P (x) is the probability of a minority victory when vm demands x ∈ (0, n−12 )
votes and vM offers his vote for sale. Since P (x) < 1 for all x ∈ (0, n−12 ), and
Um (x) is increasing in P (x) and decreasing in x, it follows that Um (x) < (1 −
qM¯) (vm − p)+qM¯ (−p). Hence Um
(
n−1
2
)
> (1−qM¯) (vm − p)+qM¯ (−p) is sufficient
to rule out a profitable deviation to x ∈ (0, n−1
2
). The condition is equivalent to:
qM¯
2
v¯m ≥ 2(1− qM¯)(n− 1) + qM¯(n− 1)− 4
4
p
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Substituting p from (13) and simplifying, the condition amounts to:
(2− n)q2M¯ + (3n− 5)qM¯ − 2n+ 6 ≥ 0
This function is increasing in qM¯ for all n ≥ 3. By equation 11, qM¯ ≥ n−1n+1 . Hence,
we can evaluate the condition at qM¯ =
n−1
n+1
. If it is positive, the deviation is not
profitable. Substituting, we obtain n2 + 2n + 13 ≥ 0, which is trivially satisfied
for all n. Hence for any sm ∈ [1, n−12 ), Um(sm) < Um(n−12 ). We can conclude that
when facing the strategy profile defined in the candidate equilibrium, vm’s best
response can only be either sM = −1 or sM = n−12 . System 7 guarantees that vm
is indifferent between them.
(iii) Consider vi ∈ M , vi 6= vM . We show here that, given others’ specified strategies,
vi’s best response is selling: si = −1. First notice that, as argued above and for
the same reasons, Ui(si) < Ui(
n−1
2
) for any si ∈ (n−12 , n− 1]. We need to treat the
cases n ≥ 5 and n = 3 separately.
(iii.a) Suppose first n > 3. In this case, for the same reasons described above
Ui(0) < Ui(−1). If a deviation from si = −1 is profitable, it must be to some
si ∈ (0, n−12 ]. Suppose first sM = −1. Then in the candidate equilibrium the
profile of others’ strategies faced by vi is identical to the profile faced by vM .
In particular, Ui(−1) = UM(−1) = UM(n−12 ) > UM(s) for all s ∈ [0, n−12 ).
But Ui(s) is increasing in vi for all s ∈ (0, n−12 ]; hence for all s in this interval
Ui(s) < UM(s), and thus Ui(−1) > Ui(s) for all s ∈ (0, n−12 ]. Thus if sM = −1,
si = −1 is vi’s best response. Suppose then sM = n−12 . For all si ∈ [0, n−32 ),
vi is never rationed, but there is always another voter, either vM or vm, who
exits the market holding a majority of the votes. Hence the strategy is costly
for vi and never increases the probability of his side winning. It is dominated
by si = −1. Consider then the two remaining strategies si = n−12 , and si =
n−3
2
. Conditional on sM =
n−1
2
, the relevant expected utilities are:
Ui∈M
(
n− 1
2
)
sM =
n−1
2
= (1− qm)
(
vi − n− 1
4
p
)
+ qm
(
2vi
3
− n− 1
6
p
)
Ui∈M
(
n− 3
2
)
sM =
n−1
2
= (1− qm)
(
vi − n− 3
2
p
)
+ qm
(
2vi
3
− n− 3
6
p
)
(15)
Ui∈M (−1)
sM =
n−1
2
= (1− qm)
(
vi +
p
2
)
+ qm
(
vi
2
+
n− 1
2(n− 2)p
)
Taking into account qm ∈
[
n−1
n+1
, 1
]
, equation 12, and vi ≤ vM , it is then
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straightforward to show that, conditional on sM =
n−1
2
, Ui∈M (−1) > Ui∈M
(
n−1
2
)
,
and Ui∈M (−1) > Ui∈M
(
n−3
2
)
. But if si = −1 is vi’s best response both when
sM = −1 and when sM = n−12 , than it is vi’s best response when vM random-
izes between sM = −1 and sM = n−12 . No profitable deviation exists.
(iii.b) Suppose now n = 3. There are two M voters; hence vi ∈ M , vi ≤ vM , is
v(2)M , the M voter with second highest value. This case must be considered
separately because if n = 3, and only if n = 3, v(2)M can induce no trade with
probability qmqM by unilaterally deviating and staying out of the market.
Conditional on sM =
n−1
2
= 1, the relevant expected utilities are:
U(2)M (1) sM = 1
= (1− qm)
(
vi − n− 1
4
p
)
+ qmvi
U(2)M (0) sM = 1
= vi (16)
U(2)M (−1) sM = 1 = (1− qm)
(
vi +
p
2
)
+ qm
(vi
2
+ p
)
It is immediately clear that U(2)M (0) > U(2)M (1). Given equations 13 and 11,
U(2)M (−1) > U(2)M (0) for all vm ∈ [ρ(3)vM , ρ¯(3)vM ] ⇐⇒ vm > (2/3)v(2)M .
Thus si = −1 is indeed a best response for v(2)M as long as
vm ∈
[
max{(2/3)v(2)M , ρ(3)vM}, ρ¯(3)vM
]
.
(iv) Finally, consider vi ∈ m, vi 6= vm. Note that such a voter only exists for n > 3.
Again, we show here that, given others’ specified strategies, vi’s best response
is selling: si = −1. The proof proceeds as above. First notice that, as above,
Ui(si) < Ui(
n−1
2
) for any si ∈ (n−12 , n−1], and Ui(0) < Ui(−1). If a deviation from
si = −1 is profitable, it must be to some si ∈ (0, n−12 ]. Suppose first sm = −1.
Then in the candidate equilibrium the profile of others’ strategies faced by vi is
identical to the profile faced by vm. In particular, Ui(−1) = Um(−1) = Um(n−12 ) >
Um(s) for all s ∈ [0, n−12 ). But Ui(s) is increasing in vi for all s ∈ (0, n−12 ]; hence for
all s in this interval Ui(s) < Um(s), and thus Ui(−1) > Ui(s) for all s ∈ (0, n−12 ].
Thus if sm = −1, si = −1 is vi’s best response. Suppose then sm = n−12 . Exactly
as argued above, if si ∈ [0, n−32 ), vi is never rationed, but there is always another
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voter, either vM or vm, who exits the market holding a majority of the votes.
Hence the strategy is costly for vi and never increases the probability of his side
winning. It is dominated by si = −1. Consider then the two remaining strategies
si =
n−1
2
, and si =
n−3
2
. Conditional on sm =
n−1
2
, the relevant expected utilities
are:
Ui∈m
(
n− 1
2
)
sm =
n−1
2
= (1− qM¯)
(
vi − n− 1
4
p
)
+ qM¯
(
2vi
3
− n− 1
6
p
)
Ui∈m
(
n− 3
2
)
sm =
n−1
2
= (1− qM¯)
(
vi − n− 3
2
p
)
+ qM¯
(
2vi
3
− n− 3
6
p
)
Ui∈m (−1)
sm =
n−1
2
= (1− qM¯)
(
vi +
p
2
)
+ qM¯
(
vi
2
+
n− 1
2(n− 2)p
)
Taking into account qM ∈
[
n−1
n+1
, 1
]
, equation 13, and vi ≤ vm, it is then straight-
forward to show that, conditional on sm =
n−1
2
, Ui∈m (−1) > Ui∈m
(
n−1
2
)
, and
Ui∈m (−1) > Ui∈m
(
n−3
2
)
. But if si = −1 is vi’s best response both when sm = −1
and when sm =
n−1
2
, than it is vi’s best response when vm randomizes between
sm = −1 and sm = n−12 . No profitable deviation exists. We can conclude that
if vm ∈ [max{µ(n)v(2)M , ρ(n)vM}, ρ¯(n)vM ], where µ(n) is given by equation 6,
and ρ(n) and ρ¯(n) are given by system 10, the strategies described in the the-
orem, together with the price and the mixing probabilities characterized in sys-
tem 8, are indeed an ex ante equilibrium of the full information game. Note
that ρ(n)vM > µ(n)v(2)M for all n > 3; if n = 3, ρ(3)vM > (2/3)v(2)M ⇐⇒
v(2)M < (3/4)vM .
2. Consider now vm ∈ [µ(n)v(2)M , ρ(n)vM ], where µ(n) is given by relation 6. Note that
this case is relevant if ρ(n)vM > µ(n)v(2)M , and thus for all n > 3, or for v(2)M <
(3/4)vM if n = 3. Suppose all voters adopt the strategies described in the theorem,
and qM = 1. Expected market clearing (equation 11) implies qm =
n−1
n+1
, and Um(−1) =
Um(
n−1
2
) (or equation 13) implies p = 2vm
n+1
. Thus suppose system 8 holds. We show
here that such strategies and price are an ex ante equilibrium of the full information
game. As above, we rule out any profitable deviation for each voter in turn. Again,
note that for any voter any demand si > n − 1 is always fully rationed, and thus is
equivalent to si = 0.
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(i) Consider first voter vM . In the candidate equilibrium, sM =
n−1
2
. As argued
earlier, it remains true that for any sM ∈ (n−12 , n − 1], UM(sM) < UM(n−12 ):
demanding more votes than required to achieve a strict majority does not affect
the probability of rationing and is strictly costly. Similarly, it remains true that
for any sM ∈ [0, n−12 ), UM(sM) < UM(−1): demanding less than n−12 votes is
dominated by selling. The argument is identical to what described earlier. Thus
the only deviation we need to consider is to sM = −1. The relevant expected
utilities are:
UM
(
n− 1
2
)
= qm¯
(
vM
2
− n− 1
4
p
)
+ (1− qm¯)
(
vM − n− 1
2
)
UM (−1) = qm¯
(p
2
)
+ (1− qm¯) (vM)
Substituting qm =
n−1
n+1
and p = 2vm
n+1
, we obtain:
UM
(
n− 1
2
)
≥ UM (−1)⇔ vM ≥ n+ 5
n+ 1
vm =
1
ρ(n)
vm
The requirement established the upper bound of the range of vm values considered
here: vm ∈ [µ(n)v(2)M , ρ(n)vM ].
(ii) Consider voter vm. The arguments discussed under point 1.(ii) apply. With
sM =
n−1
2
and all other voters selling, sm =
n−1
2
and sm = −1 dominate all
other vm’s strategies. With p =
2vm
n+1
, vm is indifferent between them and has no
profitable deviation.
(iii) Consider now vi ∈ M , vi 6= vM . We show here that, given others’ specified
strategies, vi’s best response is selling: si = −1. By the arguments under point
1.(iii) above, the only deviations we need to consider are si =
n−1
2
and si =
n−3
2
.
The relevant expected utilities are given by system 15 for n > 3, and system 16 for
n = 3. Substituting p = 2vm
n+1
, and qm =
n−1
n+1
, we derive the following conditions.
If n > 3:
Ui∈M
(
n− 1
2
)
≤ Ui∈M (−1)⇔ vi (n− 2)(n− 1)
2(n2 + n− 5) ≤ vm
and
Ui∈M
(
n− 3
2
)
≤ Ui∈M (−1)⇔ vi (n− 2)(n− 1)(n+ 1)
2(n3 + 3n2 − 19n+ 21) ≤ vm
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The two conditions are satisfied if and only if µ(n)vi ≤ vm. Thus they are satisfied
for all vi ∈M , vi ≤ vM if they are satisfied for vi = v(2)M . If n = 3:
U(2)M(1) ≤ U(2)M(−1)⇔
v(2)M
2
≤ vm
and:
U(2)M(0) ≤ U(2)M(−1)⇔ 2
3
v(2)M ≤ vm
This latter condition is stricter and again is satisfied if and only if µ(3)v(2)M ≤ vm.
For all n, we have established the lower bound of the range of vm values considered
here: vm ∈ [µ(n)v(2)M , ρ(n)vm]. Recall that ρ(n)vM > µ(n)v(2)M for all n > 3,
but if n = 3, ρ(3)vM > µ(3)v(2)M ⇐⇒ v(2)M < (3/4)vM if n = 3.
(iv) Finally, consider vi ∈ m, vi 6= vm. Again, this voter only exists if n > 3. The
arguments in 1.(iv) above can be applied identically here and establish that si =
−1 is vi’s unique best response. In particular, if sm = −1, the profile of others’
strategies faced by vi is identical to the profile faced by vm. Given others’ specified
strategies, the differential utility from selling, relative to any other action, is
decreasing in vi; hence if sm = −1 is vm’s best response, then it must be a best
response for vi ≤ vm. If sm = n−12 , the identical proof detailed in 1.(iv) is relevant.
The proof made use of the constraint qM¯ ∈
[
n−1
n+1
, 1
]
, which is still satisfied here.
We conclude that for all vm ∈
[
µ(n)v(2)M , ρ(n)vM
]
, where µ(n) is given by relation
6, the strategies described in the theorem, together with the price and the mixing
probabilities characterized in system 7, are indeed an ex ante equilibrium of the full
information game. If n = 3, this case is only relevant if v(2)M <
3
4
vM .
3. Consider now vm > ρ¯(n)vM , where ρ¯(n) is defined in system 10. Suppose all voters
adopt the strategies described in the theorem, and qm = 1. Expected market clearing
(equation 11) implies qM =
n−1
n+1
, and UM(−1) = UM(n−12 ) (or equation 12) implies
p = 2vM
n+1
. Thus suppose system 9 holds. We show here that such strategies and price
are an ex ante equilibrium of the full information game. As above, we rule out any
profitable deviation for each voter in turn. The proofs follow immediately from the
arguments used earlier. In particular:
(i) Consider first voter vM . The arguments discussed under point 1.(i) apply. With
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sm =
n−1
2
and all other voters selling, sM =
n−1
2
and sM = −1 dominate all
other vM ’s strategies. With p =
2vM
n+1
, vM is indifferent between them and has no
profitable deviation.
(ii) Consider then voter vm. Recall that when vM randomizes between sM =
n−1
2
and
sM = −1 and all others sell, sm = n−12 and sm = −1 dominate all other vm’s
strategies. Substituting qM =
n−1
n+1
and p = 2vM
n+1
in the expected utility of the
minority leader for the two possibilities yield:
Um
(
n− 1
2
)
≥ Um (−1)⇔ vm ≥ (n− 1)(n+ 5)
(n+ 1)(n+ 3)
v¯M = ρ¯(n)vM
The condition establishes the lower bound of the range of vm values considered
under this case.
(iii) Consider vi ∈ M , vi 6= vM . If n > 3, the arguments in 1.(iii.a) above can be
applied identically here and establish that si = −1 is vi’s unique best response.
In particular, if sM = −1, the profile of others’ strategies faced by vi is identical
to the profile faced by vM . Hence if sM = −1 is vM ’s best response, then it must
be a best response for vi ≤ vM . If sM = n−12 , the identical proof detailed in 1.(iii)
is relevant. The proof made use of the constraint qm ∈
[
n−1
n+1
, 1
]
, which is still
satisfied here. If n = 3, vi ≡ v(2)M and:
U(2)M (1) sm = 1
= qMv(2)M + (1− qM)
(v(2)M
2
+
p
2
)
U(2)M (0) sm = 1
= qMv(2)M
U(2)M (−1) sm = 1 = qM
(v(2)M
2
+ p
)
+ (1− qM)
(p
2
)
With p = 2vM
n+1
and qM =
1
2
by equation 11, it is trivial to verify that U(2)M (−1) >
U(2)M (1) and U(2)M (−1) > U(2)M (0).
(iv) Finally, when n > 3, consider vi ∈ m, vi 6= vm. The problem faced here by vi ∈ m
is identical to the problem faced by vi ∈ M , vi 6= vM in case 2.(iii) above, when
qM = 1, qm =
n−1
n+1
. Taking into account p = 2v¯M
n+1
, all profitable deviations can be
ruled out if and only if vi max
{
(n−2)(n−1)
2(n2+n−5) ,
(n−2)(n−1)(n+1)
2(n3+3n2−19n+21)
}
≤ vM , or viµ(n) ≤ vM .
Because µ(n) < 1, two observations follow immediately. First, if vM ≥ vm, the con-
dition viµ(n) ≤ vM for all vi ∈ m, vi 6= vm is always satisfied. Thus the strategies
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described in the theorem, together with the price and mixing probabilities character-
ized in system 9 are indeed an ex ante equilibrium of the full information game for all
vm ∈ (ρ¯(n)vM , vM ]. Second, the condition vM ≥ vm has not been imposed anywhere in
the proof of the equilibrium of case 3. The equilibrium requires vm > ρ¯(n)vM , where
ρ¯(n) < 1, and, for n > 3, viµ(n) ≤ vM ∀vi ∈ m, vi 6= vm. Thus it is compatible with
vm > vM , as long as vM ≥ µ(n)v(2)m if n > 5, and with no additional constraint if
n = 3. Hence Lemma 3 follows immediately.
We now show that when preferences are private information, the strategies and price
identified above constitute a fully revealing ex ante equilibrium.
Fully revealing equilibrium
We conjecture an equilibrium identical to the full information equilibrium characterized
above and show that given others’ strategies, the equilibrium price and the knowledge that
the market is in a fully revealing equilibrium, each voter’s best response when preferences
are private information is uniquely identified and equals the voter’s best response with full
information. Thus the equilibrium exists when preferences are private information and is
indeed fully revealing.
1. Consider first the perspective of voter vM , in equilibrium. In any of the scenarios
identified above, expected market equilibrium requires vM to demand a positive number
of votes with positive probability. It then follows that the other voter who demands a
positive number of votes with positive probability must belong to the minority. If not,
vM ’s best response would be to sell, violating expected market equilibrium. Thus vM
also knows that M − 1 majority members and m − 1 minority members are offering
their vote for sale; he cannot identify them individually, but that is irrelevant. Given
that the other net demand for votes comes from a minority voter, vM ’s best response
is identified uniquely and is identical to his best response under full information.
2. Consider then the perspective of voter vm. If n = 3, he is the only minority voter and
the problem is trivial. Suppose n > 3. Suppose first that vm ∈
[
µ(n)v(2)M , ρM(n)vM
]
,
and hence sM =
n−1
2
with probability 1. Expected market balance requires vm to
demand a positive number of votes with positive probability. But that can only be a
best response if the voter who demands n−1
2
votes belongs to the majority; if not, vm’s
best response would be to sell. Again, vm also knows that M − 1 majority members
and m − 1 minority members are offering their vote for sale; he cannot identify them
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individually, but that is irrelevant. Suppose now vm ∈ [ρ(n)vM , ρ¯(n)vM ]. Expected
market balance rules out that vm could sell with probability 1 (because over this range
of valuations the minimal expected demand of votes by vm required for expected market
balance is min(qm)(
n−1
2
)+(1−min(qm)(−1) =
(
n−1
n+1
)
(n−1
2
)+
(
1− n−1
n+1
)
(−1) = n−5
2(n+1)
>
−1 for all n ≥ 3). Given the profile of strategies faced by vm, staying out of the market
(sm = 0) is always dominated by selling. Thus vm’s best response in equilibrium
must include demanding a positive number of votes with positive probability. As in all
previous cases, demanding more than n−1
2
votes is always dominated by demanding n−1
2
votes. Thus the actions over which vm can randomize with positive probability are sm =
n−1
2
, sm = x, with 0 ≤ x < n−12 , and sm = −1. Suppose that the voter demanding n−12
with probability qM (with qM identified in system 7), and selling otherwise, belonged
to the minority. Then:
Um
(
n− 1
2
)
(v¯M ∈ m)e
= (1− qM¯)
(
vm − n− 1
2
p
)
+ qM¯
(
vm − n− 1
4
p
)
Um (−1)
(v¯M ∈ m)e
= (1− qM¯) · 0 + qM¯
(
vm +
p
2
)
(17)
Um (x)
(v¯M ∈ m)e
= (1− qM¯) (P (x)vm − xp) + qM¯ (vm − xp)
where the index (vm ∈ m)e indicates the belief that the other voter with positive
expected demand belongs to the minority. System 17 is similar to system 14. In
particular: (1) The differential utility from selling relative to demanding x ∈ [0, n−1
2
)
votes, Um (−1)− Um (x), is identical. We saw earlier that such term must be positive
for all qM¯ ∈
[
n−1
n+1
, 1
]
, a result that thus applies immediately here. (2) For all vm > 0, the
differential utility from selling relative to demanding n−1
2
votes, Um (−1)− Um
(
n−1
2
)
,
is strictly higher than in system 14, where, at equilibrium qM¯ , it equalled 0. Hence
at equilibrium qM¯ it must be positive here. It follows that if the voter demanding
n−1
2
with probability qM belonged to the minority, vm’s best response would be to
sell. But that would violate expected market balance. Hence the voter demanding
n−1
2
with probability qM must belong to the majority. Of all remaining voters offering
their votes for sale, M − 1 belongs to the majority, and m − 1 to the minority. They
cannot be distinguished but that has no impact on vm’s unique best response. Finally,
suppose either vm ∈ (ρ¯(n)v¯M , vM ], or vM ∈
[
µ(n)v(2)m, vm
]
. Expected market balance
requires sm =
n−1
2
with probability 1. But then the other voter demanding n−1
2
votes
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with positive probability cannot belong to the minority (because in a fully revealing
equilibrium, if sm =
n−1
2
with probability 1, all other minority voters would prefer to
sell). Hence again the other voter with positive demand for votes must be a majority
voter. All remaining voters are sellers; identifying the group each of them belongs to
is not possible but has no impact on vm’s unique best response.
3. Consider now the perspective of all voters who in the full information equilibrium offer
their vote for sale with probability 1: vi ∈ M , vi 6= vM , or vi ∈ m, vi 6= vm. By the
arguments above, each of them knows that in a fully revealing equilibrium the two
voters with positive expected demand must belong to the two different parties. Which
one belongs to the majority and which one to the minority cannot be distinguished,
but is irrelevant: since in the full information case vi’s best response is si = −1 with
probability 1 whether vi ∈ M , or vi ∈ m, it follows that identifying which of the two
voters with positive expected demand belongs to which group is irrelevant to vi’s best
response. Equally irrelevant is identifying which of the sellers belongs to which group.
Although the direction of preferences associated with each individual voter cannot
be identified, vi’s best response is unique and identical to his best response with full
information.
We can conclude that the equilibrium strategies and price identified by Lemmas 2 and 3 are
indeed a fully revealing ex ante equilibrium with private information.
A.2 Proof of the Corollary to Theorem 2
Corollary 1. For any α ∈ (0, 1
2
)
and F , Pr[ lim
n→∞
qG,n(v) = 1] = 1, and Pr[ lim
n→∞
qG,n(v) =
1] = 1
Proof. For h = g,G, define qh,n(v) as a sequence of random variables that take the values
specified in Theorem 1 if the condition in the theorem is satisfied, and 0 otherwise. We will
use the Borel Cantelli lemma. In the context of almost sure convergence, it implies that a
sufficient condition for a sequence of random variable Xn to converge almost surely to X is
that ∀ > 0,∑∞k=1 Pr(|Xk−X| > ) <∞. In the specific case of the corollary to Theorem 2,
we want to show that for h = g,G, ∀ > 0,∑∞k=1 Pr(|qh¯,k−1| > ) <∞. Fix  > 0. Choose n0
a positive integer such that n0−1
n0+1
≥ 1− and α·n0 > 1 so that αk2 ≤ bαkc for k > n0. Then, for
all k ≥ n0, Pr({|qh¯,k−1| ≥ }) ≤ Pr(G = m∩v¯M ≤ µ(n)v(2)m)+Pr(G = M∩v¯m ≤ µ(n)v(2)M).
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For k ≥ n0, m = bαkc, M = k −m, we know that P (G = m ∩ v¯M ≤ µ(n)v(2)m) ≤ F
(
1
2
)M
and P (G = M ∩ v¯m ≤ µ(n)v(2)M) ≤ F
(
1
2
)m
. We can then write for all k ≥ n0 that
P ({|qh¯,k − 1| ≥ }) ≤ 2F
(
1
2
)α
2
k
. Hence,
∞∑
k=n0
P (|qh¯,k − 1| > ) ≤
∞∑
k=n0
2F
(
1
2
)α
2
k
The latter is the partial sum of a geometric sum with a multiplicative term strictly between
0 and 1. This sum is finite. By the Borel Cantelli lemma, the result is proven.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. For all distributions F , if all vi, i ∈ m and i ∈ M are i.i.d. with distribution
F , then for all n and m, θ∗m ≤ 11+(Mm) ≤
m
n
.
Proof. Call a realization of n values a profile Π, and call a partition P(Π) a corresponding
minority profile m and majority profile M: P(Π)={m,M}34. The probability of a profile Π
depends on the distribution F , but note that because values are i.i.d., given Π any partition
P(Π) is equally likely. Call Vm the sum of realized minority values (Vm =
∑
i∈m vi), and sim-
ilarly for VM (VM =
∑
j∈M vj). Consider any P(Π)={m,M} such that Vm > VM , supposing
that at least one such profile Π and partition P(Π) exist. Now, keeping Π fixed, consider an
alternative partition P ′(Π) such that the values in the minority profile m are reassigned to
majority voters. By construction, VM > Vm. The values assigned to the remaining M −m
majority voters are chosen freely among all realized values in the original majority profile
M. Thus for any m, there are
(
n−m
M−m
)
=
(
M
M−m
)
=
(
M
m
)
equally likely partitions P ′(Π) such
that VM > Vm. But then: Pr(VM > Vm|Π) ≥
(
M
m
)
Pr(Vm > VM |Π), with inequality because
for given Π we are ignoring partitions P ′′(Π) such that some of m values are associated with
minority and some with majority voters and VM > Vm.
35. Now:
Pr(VM > Vm) =
∫
Π
Pr(VM > Vm|Π)dG ≥
(
M
m
)∫
Π
Pr(Vm > VM |Π)dG =
(
M
m
)
Pr(Vm > VM)
34For clarity: for any Π, there are
(
n
m
)
possible partitions P(Π), and for any partition P(Π) there are
m!M ! possible permutations of values among the different voters, all keeping P(Π) = {m,M} constant.
35We are not ignoring those such that Vm > VM because they are taken into account as different initial
partitions P˜(Π).
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where G = F n is the joint density of a profile Π. But Pr(Vm > VM) = 1−Pr(VM > Vm).
Hence: Pr(Vm > VM) ≤ 11+(Mm) . To establish that
1
1+(Mm)
≤ m
m+M
, note that it is equivalent
to (m− 1)!(M −m)! ≤ (M − 1)!, or (M−1
m−1
) ≥ 1, an inequality that holds for all m ≥ 1.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2. For all n, m , and F , θm > θ
∗
m.
Proof. We know that if vg > v(2)G, the equilibrium in Theorem 1 always applies. If G = m
(i.e. vn ∈ m), m wins with probability n+32(n+1) ; if G = M (i.e. vn ∈ M), m wins with
probability n−1
2(n+1)
if vm < ρvM , and with some probability ∈ ( n−12(n+1) , n+32(n+1)) otherwise.
Hence:
θm >
n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
Pr(G = m ∩ vM > v(2)m) + n− 1
2(n+ 1)
Pr(G = M ∩ vm > v(2)M) (18)
The inequality is strict both because equation 18 sets to n−1
2(n+1)
the probability of minority
victories whenever vg > v(2)G and G = M , and because it ignores value realizations such
that vg ∈ (µ(n)v(2)G, v(2)G)–the condition in Theorem 1 is satisfied, and the minority wins
with positive probability.36 With i.i.d. value draws:
Pr(G = m ∩ vM > v(2)m) = Pr(G = M ∩ vm > v(2)M) = mM
n(n− 1)
Thus:
θm >
n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
mM
n(n− 1) +
n− 1
2(n+ 1)
mM
n(n− 1) =
mM
n(n− 1)
Given Lemma 1, the proposition follows if for all m, n, m(n−m)
n(n−1) ≥ 11+(n−mm ) . Define fn(m) =
m(n−m)(n−m
m
)
. The inequality then amounts to fn(m) ≥ n(n− 1). We first show that for
given n, ∀m ∈ {1, . . . , n−1
2
}, fn(m) ≥ min
(
f(2), fn
(
n−1
2
))
. For m ∈ {2, . . . , n−1
2
}:
fn(m)
fn(m− 1) =
m
m− 1
n−m
n−m+ 1
(n− 2m+ 1)(n− 2m+ 2)
(n−m+ 1)m
Define g(x) = ln
(
fn(x)
fn(x−1)
)
for x > 1. Then ∀x > 1, g′(x) = − 1
n−x − 1x−1 + 2n−x+1 −
2
n−2x+1 − 2n−2x+2 . Because 2n−x+1 < 2n−2x+1 for any positive x, g′(x) < 0 for all x > 1.
36Note that such realizations have positive probability for all F with full support.
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Consequently, fn(m)
fn(m−1) decreases in m on {2, . . . , n−12 }. Moreover,
fn(2)
fn(1)
= (n−2)
2(n−3)
(n−1)2 ≥ 1
and
fn(n−12 )
fn(n−32 )
= 8(n+1)
(n−3)(n+3)2 ≤ 1. Therefore, fn(m) ≥ min
(
fn(, 2), fn
(
n−1
2
))
for all m ∈
{1, . . . , n−1
2
}. Substituting m = n−1
2
in fn(m), we find that fn
(
n−1
2
) ≥ n(n − 1) ⇔ n3 −
7n2 + 7n− 1 ≥ 0, which holds for all n > 5. Substituting m = 2 in n3− 8n2 + 17n− 12 ≥ 0,
which holds for all n > 8. Therefore, if n ≥ 9, for all m, F , θm > θ∗m. For n ∈ {3, 5, 7} we
can compute directly the lower bound for θm,
m(n−m)
n(n−1) , and the upper bound for θ
∗
m,
1
1+(n−mm )
,
for m ∈ {1, . . . , n−1
2
} and verify that the result continues to hold.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4. For all F , n, and m, if EF (v) >
2(n−m)
n(n−2m+1)EF,n(v(1)) then W < W0.
Proof. Recall that Vm denotes the sum of realized minority values (Vm =
∑
i∈m vi), and VM
the sum of realized majority values (VM =
∑
j∈M vj). For value realizations such that the
condition in Theorem 1 is not satisfied, the equilibrium construction selects the majority
voting outcome, and thus (W |vg < µv(2)G) = (W0|vg < µv(2)G). When the value realizations
belong to regions AM ( ρvM > vm > µv(2)M ) or A (ρvM > vm > ρvM ), vM > vm,
and given m < M and i.i.d. values, it follows that E[VM |AM , A] > E[Vm|AM , A]. Thus
(W |ρvM > vm > µv(2)M) < (W0|ρvM > vm > µv(2)M). Hence, for all n and m, a sufficient
condition for W < W0 is E[VM |Am] > E[Vm|Am]. As a reminder, values in Am satisfy
vm > ρvM , vM > µv(2)m.
Assume a value distribution F with density f . Denote h(u) = EF (v|v ≤ u) the ex-
pectation of a random variable drawn from F conditional on being lower than u. We can
write
P (v¯m > ρv¯M ) · E[VM |v¯m > ρv¯M ] =
∫ 1
x=0
∫ min(x
ρ
,1
)
z=0
[z + (M − 1)h(z)]Mf(z)F (z)M−1mf(x)F (x)m−1dzdx
P (v¯m > ρv¯M ) · E[Vm|v¯m > ρv¯M ] =
∫ 1
x=0
∫ min(x
ρ
,1
)
z=0
[x+ (m− 1)h(x)]Mf(z)F (z)M−1mf(x)F (x)m−1dzdx
The first integral can be written as
P (v¯m > ρv¯M) · E[VM |v¯m > ρv¯M ] =
∫ 1
z=0
[z + (M − 1)h(z)]Mf(z)F (z)M−1 [F (x)m]1ρz dz
=
∫ 1
z=0
[z + (M − 1)h(z)]Mf(z)F (z)M−1 [1− F (ρz)m] dz
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Likewise, the second integral yields
P (v¯m > ρv¯M) · E[Vm|v¯m > ρv¯M ] =
∫ ρ
x=0
[x+ (m− 1)h(x)]mf(x)F (x)m−1 [F (z)M]xρ
0
dx
+
∫ 1
x=ρ
[x+ (m− 1)h(x)]mf(x)F (x)m−1 [F (z)M]1
0
dx
=
∫ ρ
x=0
[x+ (m− 1)h(x)]mf(x)F (x)m−1F
(
x
ρ
)M
dx
+
∫ 1
x=ρ
[x+ (m− 1)h(x)]mf(x)F (x)m−1dx
We can then compare the two quantities. If P (v¯m > ρv¯M) · E[VM |v¯m > ρv¯M ] − P (v¯m >
ρv¯M) · E[Vm|v¯m > ρv¯M ] is positive, then W < W0.
We know that ρ < 1. Given the definition of Am, a sufficient condition for the difference
to be positive is that it is positive at ρ = 1, since this raises the lower bound on barvm
(generating a higher Vm in expectation) and decreases the lower bound on v¯M (generating a
lower VM in expectation).
Substitute ρ = 1 in the equations above. Then,
P (v¯m > v¯M) · E[VM |v¯m > v¯M ] =
∫ 1
z=0
[z + (M − 1)h(z)]Mf(z)F (z)M−1 [1− F (z)m] dz (19)
and
P (v¯m > v¯M) · E[Vm|v¯m > v¯M ] =
∫ 1
x=0
[x+ (m− 1)h(x)]mf(x)F (x)m−1F (x)M dx (20)
Denote
∆ =
∫ 1
0
[x+ (M − 1)h(x)]f(x)F (x)M−1 [1− 2F (x)m] dx
Let us write Ak =
∫ 1
0
xf(x)F (x)k−1dx. Substituting h(x) =
∫ x
0 vf(v)dv
F (x)
,
∆ = AM − 2An + (M − 1)
(∫ 1
0
[∫ x
0
vf(v)dv
]
f(x)F (x)M−2dx− 2
∫ 1
0
[∫ x
0
vf(v)dv
]
f(x)F (x)n−2dx
)
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Writing Ev = EF (v),∫ 1
0
[∫ x
0
vf(v)dv
]
f(x)F (x)M−2dx =
1
M − 1
[∫ x
0
vf(v)dv · F (x)M−1
]1
0
− 1
M − 1
∫ 1
0
xf(x)F (x)M−1dx
=
1
M − 1 [Ev − AM ]∫ 1
0
[∫ x
0
vf(v)dv
]
f(x)F (x)n−2dx =
1
n− 1
[∫ x
0
vf(v)dv · F (x)2(M−1)
]1
0
− 1
n− 1
∫ 1
0
xf(x)F (x)n−1dx
=
1
n− 1 [Ev − An]
Hence, we have that ∆ = −2An +Ev− 2M−1n−1 (Ev−An). Now, let us substract Equation
20 from Equation 19.
(19)− (20) = M∆ +M
∫ 1
0
[x+ (M − 1)h(x)]f(x)F (x)n−1dx−
∫ 1
x=0
[x+ (m− 1)h(x)]mf(x)F (x)n−1dx
= M∆ +M · An + M(M − 1)
n− 1 (Ev − An)−m · An −
m(m− 1)
n− 1 (Ev − An)
By simple manipulations, aggregating the terms in Ev and An, one finds
(19)− (20) > 0⇔ 2M − (n− 1)
2M
Ev ≥ An
From the definition of An, and denoting E(v(1)) = EF,n(v(1)) we know that An =
1
n
E(v(1)).
Hence, the condition can be expressed as n2M−(n−1)
2M
Ev ≥ E(v(n)) which is equivalent to the
condition given in the statement of the proposition.
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